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THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT:

A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE NEWLY FOCUSED DEVELOPMENT APPROACH AND ITS
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
by Melanie Nakagawa*

O

INTRODUCTION

n March 14, 2002, while addressing the Inter-American
Development Bank, President George W. Bush
announced that the United States would increase its foreign development assistance by fifty percent as part of the U.S.
commitment to the United Nations Millennium Declaration,
which calls for “more generous development assistance” and
“enhanced debt relief” for less developed countries.1 Much of
the additional foreign aid from the United States would be
administered through the Millennium Challenge Account
(“MCA”) to countries that demonstrate they are ruling justly,
promoting economic freedom, and investing in their people.2
The MCA is implemented by the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (“MCC”). While the MCC is an innovative attempt
to achieve poverty alleviation, the MCA suffers from problems
in its design and presents potentially challenging impacts on
other donor organizations given its current implementation
scheme. This article seeks to open the door to debate the potential effectiveness of the newly-created, independent institutional home for the MCA funds, the MCC.
As described by the former MCC Chief Executive Officer
Paul Applegarth,3 “the MCC was established [on January 23,
2004] as a new innovative foreign assistance program by the
United States under the initiative and sponsorship of the
President to reduce poverty in some of the poorest countries in
the world by promoting sustainable economic growth.”4 The
MCA attempts to promote sustainable economic growth as a
mechanism to reduce poverty by funding results-based projects,
targeting countries, and having the financial support of a large
grant-based budget. The consequences of these three components have the possibility of exerting a significant influence on
how effective the MCA will be at poverty alleviation and economic development.
The approach characterized by the MCA is a departure from
the target-setting approach of the Millennium Development
Goals (“MDGs”). This article begins with an overview of the
MDGs, and how development needs to be structured around
these goals, their current status, and why the MDGs are unlikely to be achieved by the target date of 2015. The second section
describes the MCA by identifying the key components of the
MCA that make it distinct from other donor and development
models. The second section also analyzes the differences
between the MCA- and MDG-approaches to development assistance, such as the MCA’s country-initiated and country-owned
approach. The third section provides examples of how and why
the MCA might hinder the progress and efforts of donor organ13

izations to effectively provide foreign aid, specifically addressing the potential tension and friction between the MCA and U.S.
Agency for International Development (“USAID”). This article
concludes with open questions about how the MCA’s resultsbased and country-driven approach may have unintended consequences on U.S. development policy, including on donor
agencies such as USAID, and encourages debate on these
impacts that may extend to similar effects on other organizations
such as the World Bank.

THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

At the September 2000 UN Millennium Summit, the international community marked the turn of the millennium by
adopting the UN Millennium Declaration, stating that “only
through broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future,
based upon our common humanity in all its diversity, can globalization be made fully inclusive and equitable.”5 Adopted as a
General Assembly resolution, the UN Millennium Declaration
built upon the international community’s previous commitments
including those to human rights, the environment, and poverty
alleviation. Over 150 heads of state of developing and developed nations unanimously adopted the Declaration, which
pledges “to spare no effort to free all of humanity, and above all
our children and grandchildren, from the threat of living on a
planet irredeemably spoilt by human activities, and whose
resources would no longer be sufficient for their needs.”6 The
global compact reached by these world leaders endorsed a set of
time-bound and measurable targets to combat issues such as
poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation,
and discrimination against women, which became known as the
Millennium Development Goals.
The MDGs provide a common language for this global
pledge by enumerating eight goals: (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child
mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS,
malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop a global partnership for development.
Goals One through Seven are interconnected and directed at
reducing poverty in all forms. Goal Eight provides the means to
achieve the first seven goals. The MDGs set out quantifiable targets to measure country progress ranging from halving extreme
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poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS.7 The targets are to be
achieved by 2015. However, every country, whether it is an aid
donor or recipient, is responsible for the determination and
implementation of policies to achieve these goals.
If reached, the overall impact of the MDGs in the developing world would be unparalleled. For example, if the goals were
met in just ten countries, the following would likely occur:
almost six million children will go to school for the first time;
24 million more people will be able to drink clean water; for
every thousand children under the age of five, one hundred of
them would be saved from dying unnecessarily; and more than
25 million people would be raised above the poverty level of
one dollar per day.8
The international community is far from achieving the
MDGs. In particular, the success of achieving the environmentally specific goals has been quite mixed. The United Nations
Development Programme’s Human Development Report 2003
provides a comprehensive status report on poverty trends.
This Report tracked the
progress in achieving the
MDGs, which use 1990 as the
baseline year for measuring
improvement. The Report
found that many countries had
moved forward in achieving
parity between girls and boys in
primary school enrollment and
universal primary education.9
However, the Report also found
that many countries’ rates of
economic growth were not on
target to halve income poverty
by 2015.10 Similarly, in dozens of countries the report found that
the standard of living had actually declined since 1990, and that
the number of income-poor in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia,
and Latin America combined has increased by approximately
ten million people each year over the same period.11 Similarly
grim, the Report noted that if developing countries do not accelerate their progress towards creating access to safe drinking
water, close to 2.4 billion people will still be without improved
sanitation in 2015, a number that is almost equal to the number
of people lacking clean water and basic sanitation today.12
The international community is in general agreement that
current trends indicate that meeting the MDGs by 2015 is not
likely. While there are a variety of factors involved in the projected failure of the majority of developing countries to achieve
the MDGs, three commonly cited explanations are worth discussing. The first is MDGs are too limited because they lack
specific accountability for the developed countries and provide
little guidance on how to meet the MDGs in the developing
world. Second, developed nations are not implementing the
goals in a consistent, coordinated fashion. This fractured
approach is exemplified by the United States, which has chosen
to break from the MDGs and follow its own plan for development. The third preferred explanation is that the overall amount

of funding is insufficient to achieve the great alleviation of
poverty sought by the MDGs.
First, civil society organizations have proposed that the
MDGs are too limited because they lack specific accountability
for the developed countries and provide little guidance on how
to meet the MDGs in the developing world.13 The MDGs’ limitations primarily result from the fact that countries wanting to
achieve the MDGs are not given adequate guidance on how to
do so. For instance, the MDGs do not offer policy or economic
suggestions, but rather leave the implementation aspects under
the purview of each country. Compounding developing countries’ frustration in attempting to enlist assistance from the
developed world is the fact that the MDGs do not effectively
engage the rich, developed countries in this process. Aside from
signing a global compact to support the MDGs, the MDGs lack
strong incentives or accountability measures for the developed
countries to actually implement or promote them.
Second, although world
leaders signed onto the MDGs in
2000, the developed nations
have not implemented consistent
measures to provide resources
and funding for the developing
world. Few donor countries have
met the goal of providing 0.7
percent of their gross national
product in foreign aid.14 This
inconsistent implementation of
measures to promote the MDGs
among developed nations was
most recently exemplified by the
U.S. attempt to renegotiate the
proceedings at the most recent
UN World Summit in September 2005 in New York City. The
United States has not only failed to provide anywhere near 0.7
percent of its GNP in aid, but has also broken completely with
the strategy for development in the MDGs. Prior to the 2005 UN
Millennium Summit meeting, the United States was no longer in
agreement with other nations promoting the MDGs as the internationally accepted approach for framing the development agenda. Rather, the United States considered the MDGs one approach
among others. The Washington Post reported that the “the Bush
administration has thrown the [world summit] proceedings in
turmoil with a call for drastic renegotiation”15 by introducing
more than 750 amendments to the draft agreement that all the
attending world leaders would sign. These amendments called
for “striking any mention of the [MDGs]. . . Instead, the United
States has sought to underscore the importance of the Monterrey
Consensus, a 2002 summit in Mexico that focused on free-market reforms, and required governments to improve accountability in exchange for aid and debt relief.”16 These changes
“mark[ed] a final break with the pledge [to support the MDGs]
agreed by the Clinton administration.”17
The third explanation for the projected failure to achieve
the MDGs is that there is insufficient financial support from the
international community. Jeffrey Sachs, head of the Millennium

There is a debate on how
[Millennium Challenge
Account]’s large budget,
new methodology, and
country selection process
will impact USAID.
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Project based at Columbia University, developed teams of
experts to examine policies and develop approaches necessary
to accomplish the various goals. Sachs believes that it is critical
for the developed world to recognize that without sufficient aid,
the poorest countries will be unable to generate the capital necessary on their own to develop and will remain in what he calls
the “poverty trap.” Sachs mentions that with “good governance,
planning, and sufficient funds in place, the final step towards
achieving the MDGs is the implementation of specific programs
and national strategies.”18 For instance, experts and engineers at
USAID have the capacity to make progress in certain areas such
as sanitation and infant mortality, but insufficient funding has
limited the application of this expertise.19 Criticism of Sachs
focuses on the fact that his economics-driven approach overlooks the social, political, and physical environments of recipient nations; however, adequate funding is at least one critical
factor in achieving effective development assistance.20
With less than a decade left before the target deadline for
the MDGs, donor organizations and governments recognize that
their current efforts are inadequate. The United States has
refocused its development
approach by institutionalizing a
new methodology and a new
agency with a relatively large
sum of money for development
assistance to address extreme
global poverty. This newly
focused approach, represented
by the MCA, could present a
unique opportunity for the current administration to significantly transform U.S. development policy and maximize its
global impact, or it could hamper the effectiveness of already
existing aid organizations.

MCA could yield the most fundamental changes to U.S. foreign
assistance policy since President John F. Kennedy introduced
the Peace Corps, USAID, and the Alliance for Progress in the
early 1960s by providing significant amounts of foreign aid that
is bilateral and country-driven.23 Policies promoting economic
growth stimulate a wide range of positive effects on the environment, women, health, and children. Economic prosperity can
improve people’s lives by providing families with options that
promote sustainable development rather than, for example,
unsustainable environmental degradation. If the United States
has indeed found a more efficient way to promote economic
growth through the MCA, the far-reaching effects will touch on
many of the MDGs.

AVOIDING COMMON DONOR DILEMMAS: REDUCING
BUREAUCRACY, PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
PROVIDING INCENTIVES

The MCA may provide a solution for the three key shortcomings of MDGs: (1) ineffective national implementation; (2)
lack of specific accountability;
and (3) insufficient funding. The
MCA’s streamlined organization
and independent status enable it
to avoid difficulties associated
with other donor programs’ massive bureaucracies. Its resultsdriven approach addresses the
typical problems caused by lack
of coordination with recipientcountry development strategies
and focuses on achieving results
rather than initiating sound policy and governance structures.24
The MCA avoids bureaucratic
difficulties by channeling its funds through an independent government corporation, the MCC. The MCC requires accountability in recipient countries and is designed to be an accountable and
transparent local institution itself. The eligibility criteria for MCA
funds also provide an incentive for countries to demonstrate a
strong commitment towards “ruling justly, investing in their people, and encouraging economic freedom.”25

It has yet to be seen how
coordination and
cooperation is progressing
between [the Millennium
Challenge Account and
USAID].

THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT

In March 2002, President George W. Bush unveiled a new
foreign aid program, the Millennium Challenge Account, to
address development aid challenges. The Bush administration
hopes the MCA will be an effective mechanism by which the
United States can improve some of its foreign aid programs,
which have faced much criticism. For instance, USAID has been
criticized for its inability to achieve strong results in recipient
countries and the lack of accountability among its many levels of
bureaucracy. Similarly, USAID is often criticized for its highly
bureaucratic nature and competing self interests. Additionally,
the United States’ extensive practice of Congressional earmarking has forced USAID to allocate funds for politically popular
programs, such as disaster relief, instead of entirely allowing
USAID the freedom to determine on its own which programs
need funding.21 If the MCA proves successful, it is likely to have
a great influence on the way future development is implemented.
Domestically, the MCA’s success could lead to stronger
Congressional support for aid programs and general initiatives
supporting low income countries.22 If implemented properly, the
15

Reducing Bureaucracy

The MCA and the subsequent creation of an independent
implementation institution, the MCC, represent the United States’
attempt to address and resolve the bureaucratic problems faced by
other donor models and organizations. The MCC is designed to be
flexible and efficient in its contracts, program implementation,
and personnel management. The MCC sidesteps two major
bureaucratic obstacles common to other development agencies by
being an independent government corporation free from
Congressional earmarks, and by maintaining a relatively small
staff, congressionally capped at two hundred employees.
The MCC’s corporate structure is also an attempt to reduce
the effects of bureaucracy by keeping policy authority centralized in a few people organized as a “Board of Directors.” As a
corporation, it is managed by a Chief Executive Officer
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

(“CEO”) appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. It is supervised by a Board of Directors composed of the
Secretaries of State and Treasury, the U.S. Trade Representative,
the Administrator of USAID, the CEO of the MCC, and four
non-government directors nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, with the Secretary of State acting as the
Chairman of the Board.26
The Board selects countries eligible for the MCA based on
sixteen indicators falling under the three categories: “ruling justly,” “encouraging economic freedom,” and “investing in people.” The Board has discretion to look at other factors drawn in,
but not limited to, consultation with experts and supplemental
information from the U.S. State Department Human Rights
Reports and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception
Index.27 In keeping with a streamlined approach and decision
making process to allocate development aid, the Board harmonizes the relationship between the recipient country and the
MCC by signing “Compacts” with these countries. Compacts
are agreements between the recipient country and the MCC
where the recipient country has the principal responsibility of
managing and implementing the compact, with the assistance of
the MCC. Also, because MCA eligible countries are tasked with
the responsibility of submitting proposals and providing oversight and monitoring, the MCC can remain a small institution in
staff size tasked with moving the MCA to countries signing
compacts. Instead of having a significant amount of MCC staff
in each country where a compact exists, the MCC relies on each
country to report back to them. This operational method has
been called a “foundation approach” to development.

Promoting Accountability

The MCA’s means to foster accountability and country
responsibility represent departures from other development
approaches and foreign assistance programs in four ways. First,
the MCA only provides development aid to countries that show
a commitment to sound development and economic policies.
Second, the MCA proposes greater recipient involvement that
includes a “foundation approach” where the MCC receives proposals from governments and chooses which will receive funding. This places the responsibility for program design and implementation on the recipient countries.28 The MCA’s implementing
charter, the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, has focused
objectives aimed at economic growth and poverty reduction
through country-driven proposals and recipient country-monitored projects, unlike other foreign assistance programs where
the agency or organization determines where money should be
spent and for what purposes. Third, the MCA focuses on results
that require MCA recipients to delineate measurable performance benchmarks in their proposals for each request. The benchmarks must focus on substantive goals, such as increasing test
scores; raising immunization rates by a specific amount; and
institutional goals, e.g. improving auditing systems, strengthening legal codes, or training a certain number of teachers.29 These
benchmarks are more specific than the MDGs. Also, each project must incorporate aspects of monitoring and evaluating the
proposal’s progress. Fourth, the creation of the MCC to administer the MCA is meant to lower bureaucratic and administrative
FALL 2005

costs by maintaining a small accountable staff and providing
them with specific guidelines for aid allocation.

Providing Incentives

While MDGs do not delineate a plan for domestic implementation of policies geared towards achieving the goals, the
MCC provides incentives for countries seeking MCA funding to
demonstrate their commitment to “ruling justly, investing in
their people, and encouraging economic freedom.”30 As former
MCC CEO Paul Applegarth observed on the eligibility for MCA
seeking countries, “if they can get the policy environment right,
they will generate growth and capital.” Armenian Foreign
Minister Vartan Oskanian testified that this incentive-based
approach has had positive effects in that “inclusion in the
Millennium program had made [his] country ‘more focused’ on
governance, democracy, rule of law, and human rights.”31
While critics argue that the MDGs are inadequately funded,
U.S. President Bush proposed that the MCA receive funding of
five billion dollars per year within three years (by 2007), representing a fifty percent increase in official development assistance.32 The impact of the MCA funding is significant. As
Applegarth noted, “[w]hen the program is fully funded, each
[MCC] eligible country could receive as much as $300 million
in additional aid per year beyond its current foreign assistance.”33 Foreign aid and development expert Steve Radelet
describes the amount in the following manner:
For the first year, Congress has approved [one billion
dollars] in funding. If the administration’s list of firstyear qualifiers ultimately includes, say, [fifteen] countries, the average country could receive $67 million.
This is equivalent to about one-sixth of the average
total capital inflows (from aid and other sources) of
$384 per country for IDA-eligible countries.
Ultimately, if the MCA receives a total budget of, say,
three billion dollars (a figure more likely than the [five
billion dollars] proposed by the president), and 25
countries qualify, the average per country would reach
$120 million per year, equivalent to about one-third of
current capital inflows.34

The MCA’s relatively large budget, combined with the
small number of qualifying countries, could create a strong
incentive for countries to try to qualify, while enabling the contributions to make a significant impact on the developing countries that do qualify. How effective the MCC will be at achieving poverty alleviation by efficiently and effectively allocating
aid is still largely speculation. While many are optimistic about
the potential of this new methodology, others are wary that the
MCC’s country selection process and relatively small institutional size may have unintended negative consequences on the
poor developing nations that do not qualify for the MCA and
other donor agencies, particularly USAID.35

CRITIQUES OF THE MCA AND MCC

Critics of the MCA and MCC highlight a variety of problems in its design, as well as potential unforeseen or unintended
consequences. The potential design flaws include the indicators
for country selection, the administrative priority placed on the
16

MCC, and the size of the agency. The possible negative consequences include the abandonment of the poorest performing
developing countries, and the neglect and undermining of the
already established USAID. This section will discuss the critiques of the MCC and MCA’s design, as well as the potential
effects on the poorest countries. The next section will address
the interplay and competition between the MCC and USAID.
The MCA country selectivity attempts to provide an incentive for developing countries to compete to qualify for funding.
To ensure that the selection process for countries eligible for the
MCA is on their merits, the MCA uses a numerical governance
ranking system developed by private research institutes and
international agencies. Eligible countries must perform above
the average score of all countries in a minimum of half of the
indicators within the categories of ruling justly,36 economic
freedom,37 and investment in
people.38 This median approach
is problematic because, as countries develop and improve, the
overall median will inevitably
rise. If countries grow at comparable rates, those countries
developing slower than the
average rate will fail to reach
the ever rising median score.
The effect will be to permanently exclude certain countries
from MCA eligibility. Thomas
Palley, the Director of the Open
Society Institute’s Globalization
Reform Project, provides the
following analogy to illustrate
this point:

Administration is prioritizing the MCA vis-à-vis other foreign
aid programs; and (2) whether the MCA has the staffing capacity to accomplish all it sets out to achieve. If the past year provides any insight, the MCA is high on the Administration’s priority list. The first MCA grant or “Compact” was signed on
April 18, 2005 with Madagascar, just over a year after the MCA
was established. Since then four other Compacts were signed
with over $600 million promised in aid.41 However, whether
this “Compact” approach is successful, and how results-based
aid translates into reality, is still unknown, but it is clear that the
MCA has momentum.
Some foreign aid scholars have questioned whether the
small MCC staff, with a cap of two hundred employees that is
one-tenth the size of USAID’s staff, will be able to handle all
these Compacts.42 As Steve Radelet noted, “[two hundred] people seems inordinately insufficient for a program with an
annual budget of [five billion
dollars].”43 He has also speculated the MCC has contracted
out many services, including
monitoring and evaluation, and
work through USAID staff in a
particular country.44 The MCC
may also contribute to deeper
fragmentation or confusion
among U.S. aid programs
through overlapping programs.
Critics fear the high profile of
the MCA could detract
resources from other U.S. programs such as USAID. The
coming year should shed light
on the interplay between the MCC and USAID.
In its current state, the MCA may achieve its own poverty
alleviation goals with the best performers of the developing
world, roughly the top twenty percent, but this may come at the
expense of the other eighty percent that will be left to seek funding from other sources.45 Because the country selection process
uses a ranking system with a shifting median, some poor performing countries are permanently unable to qualify. These
countries, the “basket case” developing countries that do not
meet the MCA standards, will be left on the doorsteps of other
donor organizations. Other donor organizations will then be
faced with more difficult challenges in providing effective aid to
countries suffering from a myriad of factors detrimental to utilizing assistance, such as corruption, lack of good governance,
and lack of political will. Further, because these countries are
poor performers, donor agencies will be required to use additional resources to assist these countries in improving and then
effectively utilizing the aid. One study concluded it unlikely that
other donors would increase their own commitments to MCA
countries in response to the U.S. presence.46 This study found it
“much more plausible that over time other donors will reduce
their assistance to MCA countries . . . and funnel some of their
aid to other countries.”47 The results of this shift can be either

The approach
characterized by the
[Millennium Challenge
Account] is a departure
from the target-setting
approach of the
Millennium Development
Goals . . .

[T]he problem can be understood in terms of a simple
analogy with two runners who are equally fast, but one of
which begins with a half mile advantage. Given that they
are equally fast, the disadvantaged runner never catches
up with his rival, even though both are moving forward.
The policy implication is that relying on relative performance (i.e. the group median) is problematic, and it is
better to find measures that are absolute in character.39

This shifting median may ensure that some countries
always narrowly miss MCA eligibility and will only be augmented by the currently proposed yearly expansion in the pool
of eligible countries in year three to include 28 nations with
average per capita incomes between $1,435 and $2,975.
Although these countries will be assessed with separate median
scores from the countries with average incomes less than
$1,435, nevertheless, “the nations potentially eligible in year
three also have much greater access to alternative sources of
financing, with higher private capital flows, savings rates, and
government revenues . . . including this new group would divert
aid resources away from countries with greater needs and fewer
financing alternatives.”40
Two issues remain to be fully examined because the MCC
is not yet fully funded or fully staffed: (1) how the
17
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positive or negative. On one hand, more aid is freed up for nonMCA countries when donor organizations move their projects
out of MCA countries. On the other hand, donor agencies may
find that they are funding non-MCA countries incapable of successfully utilizing aid and therefore adding to the list of failed
projects.

MCA IMPACT ON THE U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The MCA could fail to achieve its goals in its own right, as
well as undermine the efforts of other donor organizations. The
MCA’s potentially significant impact on the USAID is an example of how the MCA may affect the allocation of development
aid. At present, there is a debate on how MCA’s large budget,
new methodology, and country selection process will impact
USAID. It seems inevitable that politics, institutional differences, and overlapping efforts between both agencies will cause
friction and tension.
With a budget growing to five billion dollars in 2006,
roughly doubling present U.S. spending dedicated to development, the MCA brings significant new resources to qualifying
countries. While the USAID budget remains significantly smaller than MCA’s, the MCA’s expanding funds are not only perceived by many as an affront to USAID, but also as indicative
of the Administration’s political leanings towards promoting the
MCA as a leader in foreign development. It is significant that
the Administration chose to create a stand-alone MCC, rather
than place it under the administration of USAID or the State
Department. This move has the potential to undercut USAID,
“by creating the impression that its programs are unlikely to be
as effective as those funding by the [MCC].”48 The impact the
MCC may have on USAID ranges from USAID and the MCC
working in harmony to shuttle countries from the Threshold
Program49 into the MCC’s eligible country list, to USAID and
MCC in competition for resources and struggling with interagency coordination, to USAID disappearing as a stand-alone
agency and instead becoming absorbed under another agency,
possibly the State Department or the MCC.
The MCA’s institutional structure was created to avoid the
problems faced by USAID and allow the MCA to function more
independently and with less Congressional interference. The
MCA has a relatively simple legislative framework governing it
with no legislative earmarks. In contrast, USAID faces multiple
demands from Congress each year, adding yet another layer of
bureaucracy into its aid allocation process. For example, the U.S.
Foreign Assistance Act, which determines the terms of international aid, is frequently amended and now contains 33 goals, 75
priority areas, and 247 directives.50 USAID often allocates funding for other programs and development projects because
Congress frequently engages in “earmarking,” where funds are
dedicated from the overall budget to specific, politically popular
programs.51 Congress has historically left foreign aid and
USAID missions “hamstrung with its annual list of assistance
earmarks . . . 274 at last count.”52 As one former USAID Foreign
Service Officer noted, “these earmarks . . . are more driven by
pork-barrel politics than developmental vision or knowledge of
best practices, and drastically reduce levels of flexibility, responFALL 2005

siveness and effectiveness for foreign aid.”53 This hinders
USAID in its efforts to maintain a consistent and clear budget.
Although the Administration claims that USAID and the
MCA will not compete for Congressional funds, both institutions might find themselves in competition for other resources,
such as employees and experts. USAID and MCA are independent agencies with separate budgets, and there is speculation
that Congress, under Republican leadership, will be more
inclined to fund the MCA and augment that budget in lieu of the
USAID, given that the MCC is the current administration’s initiative. The MCC “is likely to draw staff and resources from
USAID, further weakening the agency, possibly engendering
some resentment and making cooperation difficult.”54 On the
other hand, others argue that, given the drastically different
approaches to aid between the MCC and USAID, USAID’s
expertise will remain with the agency and with very few
employees will move to the MCC.55 Therefore, the MCC will be
weakened from not having the years of experience in development assistance that some USAID employees could impart on
this new agency. It has yet to be seen how coordination and
cooperation is progressing between the two organizations, and
this is likely to be under scrutiny as more of these Compacts are
signed in countries with a strong USAID presence.56
There is concern that politically less popular development
programs, such as USAID, will suffer from the reduction in the
quality of recipient countries after MCA, as a Bush
Administration initiative, picks the best performers. The deterioration of USAID recipient countries may increase USAID’s
difficulty in achieving successful development and lessen its
ability to attract Congressional fiscal support, thereby weakening the institution as a whole. In contrast to USAID’s struggle to
receive funding for growth-oriented projects, the MCA will
have five billion dollars for these projects. Therefore, a possible
unintended effect may be that USAID will become the organization whose mission will be to assist countries ineligible for
MCA funding, particularly the “threshold countries,” to improve
their domestic policy to become eligible for the MCA. This has
already begun with the “Threshold Program,”57 where USAID
allocated $40 million to help seven countries achieve MCA eligibility. To complicate the Program, threshold countries may
qualify one year and not the next. In this situation, confusion
may arise as these countries continually are shuffled between
USAID and the MCA.58 The ultimate trend signified by this
shifting of “threshold countries” is that, for better or worse,
USAID could become more of a supporting development
agency for countries seeking MCC eligibility rather than as its
own independent development agency.
The MCA has instituted a methodology for development
aid, an approach that selects only particular countries and is both
results-based and country-driven. If the MCA approach succeeds, there is likely to be an increase in pressure to reform
USAID and accelerate global demands for greater accountability in recipient governments. The MCA has the potential not only
to thwart substantive USAID development aid allocations, but
also to force USAID and possibly other institutions to reexamine
their current structure and effectiveness in foreign aid assistance.
18

CONCLUSION

The MCA is a significant attempt by the United States to
address poverty alleviation and sustainable development through
a different approach than the MDGs. However, the debate surrounding the effectiveness of the MCA and its approach leads to
a broader discussion on how to improve the MCA to better
achieve its goals and minimize the impact of the MCA on other
donor organizations. No easy solution exists, and since the MCA
is still in its beginning stages, this article hopes to foster debate
and discussion on the potential impacts of the MCA.
The following are a few questions for future consideration,
for those interested in how the MCA is impacting foreign development programs. For example, has the United States decreased
its financial commitments toward other development organizations such as USAID and the World Bank since the establishment of the MCA? Have donor organizations withdrawn their
funding or interest from certain countries as a result of the MCA
presence there? Has the World Bank noticed a decrease in countries requesting loans and are these countries instead seeking
MCA grants? Has there been a noticeable increase in the num-
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